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WHY 2007 IS NOT LIKE 1984: A BROADER
PERSPECTIVE ON TECHNOLOGY'S
EFFECT ON PRIVACY AND FOURTH
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
RIC SIMMONS*
Technological advances have generally been seen as the enemy of privacy,
giving the government advanced tools to monitor our most intimate
activities. This Article takes a broader look at the effect of new
technologies and privacy, and comes to the opposite conclusion: over the
past one hundred and fifty years, new technologies have for the most part
enhanced our privacy, and many of the invasive surveillance technologies
that the government now uses are simply a response to this enhanced level
of privacy-that is, an attempt to return to the former balance between
individual privacy and law enforcement needs. The Article first examines
the ways in which new technology has enhanced our privacy, and then
examines the effect of new technology on government surveillance, dividing
surveillance technologies into three categories: those that allow
government agents to do what was previously impossible; those that allow
government agents to conduct traditional methods of surveillance more
efficiently; and those that the government has developed in response to
privacy-enhancing technologies. The Article then reviews the current
statutory and constitutional law regarding surveillance technology in light
of these categories, and critically examines that law-and the balance or
imbalance that it creates between the two competing goals of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Moritz College of Law at the Ohio State University. I am
grateful for the extensive editing and feedback provided by Professor Angela Lloyd and the
research assistance and comments provided by Courtney Cook, J.D. 2007.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The telescreen received and transmitted simultaneously. Any sound that Winston
made, above the level of a very low whisper, would be picked up by it; moreover, so
long as he remained within the field of vision which the metal plaque commanded, he
could be seen as well as heard. There was of course no way of knowing whether you
were being watched at any given moment. How often, or on what system, the
Thought Police plugged in on any individual wire was guesswork. It was even
conceivable that they watched everybody all the time. But at any rate they could plug
in your wire whenever they wanted to. You had to live-did live, from habit that
became instinct-in the assumption that every sound you made was overheard, and,
except in darkness, every movement scrutinized.I
George Orwell's chilling vision of the future depicted ways in which
new technologies could one day be used by a totalitarian state to obliterate
all privacy and freedom. Orwell wrote the novel in 1948,2 when television
was still in its infancy, computers filled entire rooms and processed data at
a snail's pace, and devices such as thermal imagers and particle detectors
existed only in science fiction stories.3 At the dawn of this technological
revolution, Orwell presented us with a clear message: new technologies
would allow the state to dramatically increase its power over the individual,
enabling totalitarian and fascist states to control every aspect of the lives of
their citizens.4
It is now evident that Orwell's vision was wrong. Modem technology
has turned out to be the totalitarian state's worst enemy. Video cameras are
indeed everywhere, but they are embedded into cell phones and wielded by
millions of individual citizens-and as a result it is the people who are
watching the government, not the other way around.5 These same cell
GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 158 (Bernard Crick ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1984) (1949).
2 id.
3 Television use did not become widespread until the postwar era; in 1945, it is estimated
that there were only seven thousand working television sets in the entire country. History of
Television, http://www.high-techproductions.com/historyoftelevision.htm (last visited Apr.
21, 2007). Also in the postwar era, one of the first "high-speed" electrical computers began
operation. It was called the Electrical Number Integrator and Calculator, or ENIAC, and it
used 18,000 vacuum tubes and took up 1,800 square feet of floor space. exploremy: brief
history of the computer, http://www.softlord.com/comp/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2007)
[hereinafter exploremy].
4 ORWELL, supra note 1. This view is also held by many leading scholars and judges.
See, e.g., Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 466 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("Electronic surveillance... makes the police omniscient; and police omniscience is one of
the most effective tools of tyranny.").
5 As far back as 1991--eons ago in the technological age-an amateur video
photographer captured the beating of Rodney King by four Los Angeles police officers, who
were eventually convicted for violating King's civil rights. See United States v. Koon, 833
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phones use satellite transmissions to communicate information to every
comer of the globe, defying government censors.6 Meanwhile, the Internet
has exponentially increased the flow of personal, commercial, and political
information to and from individuals in ways that are largely beyond state
control. The powerful computers that were foreseen do in fact exist
today--only instead of being massive mainframes that fill rooms and that
are so expensive only huge corporations and state actors can afford them,
these computers sit on the desk or in the lap of private individuals, allowing
each of us to create, store, manipulate, and process amounts and types of
data that were inconceivable forty years ago.7  All the terrifying
technological tools that Big Brother used in Orwell's dystopian vision 8 are
instead owned and controlled by individual citizens, both in this country
and around the world. New technologies have indeed dramatically altered
the balance of power between state control and individual autonomy-but
the effect has been just the opposite of what Orwell predicted.
A similar misperception has occurred in the context of the Fourth
Amendment and privacy--despite evidence that technology has enhanced
privacy for many people, there exists a fear that new technologies are
eroding Fourth Amendment protections.. Lay people read about powerful
new surveillance technologies used by law enforcement agents and
understandably react with trepidation.9  Over the last century, the
government has begun tapping our phones;'0 flying (at lower and lower
F. Supp. 769 (C.D. Cal. 1993). As Time magazine noted in its "Person of the Year" issue for
2006: "Do a YouTube search today on the term police brutality, and you get more than 780
videos, from Houston, Hungary, Egypt, and beyond." James Poniewozik, The Beast with a
Billion Eyes, TIME, Dec. 25, 2006/Jan. 1, 2007, at 63, 63.
6 See, e.g., Mark O'Keefe, China Widens Crackdown on Faithful, OREGONIAN (Portland),
Sept. 18, 1999, at All (describing how underground Christian leaders in China
communicate with each other via cell phone while traveling around the country to evade the
authorities).
7 The ENIAC computer in use in Orwell's day was capable of making three hundred
calculations per second. exploremy, supra note 3. A modem laptop computer available for
around $1,000 can perform over two billion calculations per second. See Dell XPS M1210,
http://www.dell.com/content/products/productdetails.aspx/xpsnb-m 121 0?c=us&cs= I 9&l=en
&s=dhs&-section=specs#tabtop (last visited Apr. 21, 2007).
8 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
9 Jennifer Lee, Police Seek to Increase Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2005, at B3
(noting that after police announced installation of four hundred surveillance cameras in high-
crime, high-traffic areas in New York City, some people feared the cameras would
compromise their privacy). One councilman in Loma Linda, California equated the
installation of surveillance cameras in public areas with "Cuba or communist Russia." Jacob
Ogles, Privacy Experts Worry About Public Cameras, INLAND VALLEY DAILY BULL.
(Ontario, Cal.), Nov. 20, 2005.
10 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928).
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altitudes) over our houses and yards;11 installing video cameras or hidden
microphones in our offices, homes, and hotel rooms; 12 intercepting our e-
mails;' 3 scanning images of our faces in crowds;14 monitoring our web
browsing;' 5 seizing and copying from our hard drives; 16 and even looking
through the walls of our houses. 17 Legal scholars have also reacted with
alarm, decrying the loss of privacy and individual rights brought on by new
surveillance technologies.'
8
But the impact of new surveillance technologies is only one chapter of
the story of how technology has affected privacy in modem society. Over
the past century, millions of individuals-both innocent and culpable-
have begun using everyday technology to increase their privacy. Just as
George Orwell misunderstood the implications of new technologies by
focusing only on their use by government agents, Fourth Amendment
scholars all but ignore the ways in which technology has enabled average
citizens and criminals to keep their activities hidden from law
enforcement.' 9 New technology has also strengthened individual privacy in
1l See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451 (1989) (describing government agents flying
over the defendant's field at four hundred feet of altitude); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S.
207, 215 (1986) (describing government agents flying over the defendant's field at one
thousand feet of altitude).
12 See, e.g., United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 885 (7th Cir. 1984).
13 See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 364 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 1304-05 (D. Utah 2005).
14 See infra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
15 See Orin S. Kerr, Internet Surveillance, Law After the USA PATRIOT Act: The Big
Brother That Isn't, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 607, 633-34 (2003) [hereinafter Kerr, Internet
Surveillance].
16 See, e.g., United States v. Gray, 78 F. Supp. 2d 524, 529 (E.D. Va. 1999).
17 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29-30, 40 (2001).
18 See, e.g., Patricia L. Bellia, Surveillance, Records & Computers: Surveillance Law
Through Cyberlaw's Lens, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1375, 1458 (2004) (arguing that
government agents should have to obtain a warrant before seizing e-mail messages stored by
a third party).
19 There are a few exceptions. Some scholars have looked at the ways in which
technology has increased privacy, particularly in the context of encryption. See generally
Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment in Cyberspace: Can Encryption Create a "Reasonable
Expectation of Privacy?," 33 CoNN. L. REV. 503, 530-31 (2001) [hereinafter Kerr, Fourth
Amendment in Cyberspace] (noting that "code itself extends far greater privacy protection
than the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment ever could"). Professor Kerr also
noted in another article that in the narrow context of surveillance "[s]ome new technologies
make pre-existing forms of surveillance more intrusive; others have the opposite effect."
Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the
Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 865 (2004) [hereinafter Kerr, New Technologies]
(giving examples of thermal insulators, soundproofing, and white-noise generators as
examples of technological countermeasures which could be employed by individuals to
defeat new surveillance technologies). But Kerr also notes that "[miost commentators focus
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at least two other ways: by enabling governments to target surveillance
more effectively, resulting in more narrowly tailored searches; 20 and by
enhancing our ability to monitor the conduct of government agents.
The conventional wisdom among scholars consists of two assertions,
one factual and one normative. The factual assertion is that the effect of
new technologies has been to alter the balance between individual privacy
and the state's power to investigate crimes, thereby decreasing individual
privacy and increasing the ability of government agents to learn private
information about us.2 1 The normative assertion is that this shift is a
negative development, and therefore it is necessary to restore the original
balance-either by creating more regulations or statutes to limit
government power, or perhaps by changing the way the Fourth Amendment
is interpreted by the courts in cases involving new technologies.22 This
Article will argue that this factual assertion is incorrect-or, more
accurately, that it is incomplete-and therefore too simplistic, because it
does not take into account the wide variety of ways in which technology has
affected the balance between individual privacy and government
investigatory power.
This Article will examine the interplay between technology, law, and
privacy, taking a broad view on how technology has affected the critical
balance between individual privacy and effective law enforcement.23
Section II will examine how technology has, for the most part, enhanced the
on the [intrusive] half of this equation while ignoring the second half,"-and even Kerr
himself is only talking about counter-surveillance technology, not common, everyday
technology (such as cell phones, computers, and the Internet) which have increased privacy
(and secrecy) for nearly every member of society. Kerr, Fourth Amendment in Cyberspace,
supra, at 865 n.383.
20 See infra notes 128-133 and accompanying text.
21 See, e.g., Laurie Thomas Lee, Can Police Track Your Wireless Calls? Call Location
Information and Privacy Law, 21 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 381, 382 (2003) (suggesting
that while consumers enjoy new technologies, such as cell phones, these products have
become the consumer's "ankle bracelet," because the government can now monitor citizens'
movements more easily).
22 See, e.g., Max Guirguis, Electronic Mail Surveillance and the Reasonable Expectation
of Privacy, 8 J. TECH L. & POL'Y 135, 153-56 (2003) (arguing that the Fourth Amendment
should be interpreted to provide more privacy to e-mail conversations than to phone
conversations); Andrew E. Taslitz, The Fourth Amendment in the Twenty-First Century:
Technology, Privacy, and Human Emotions, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 130 (2002)
(arguing that the Supreme Court's approach to Fourth Amendment cases undervalues
privacy).
23 According to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, courts judge the reasonableness of a
search "by balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its




privacy of individuals in their everyday lives, allowing them to
communicate more privately, store data more securely, and conduct a much
wider range of activities within the privacy of their own homes. Section III
then turns to the effect of new technology on government surveillance, and
divides surveillance technologies into three categories: those that allow
government agents to do what was previously impossible; those that allow
government agents to conduct traditional methods of surveillance more
efficiently; and, those that the government has developed in order to combat
the privacy-enhancing technologies described in Section II. Section IV will
review the current statutory and constitutional law regarding surveillance
technology, and Section V will then critically examine that law-and the
balance or imbalance that it creates between the two competing goals of
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Finally, Section VI will examine other
ways in which technology has impacted everyday privacy.
II. TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY
In order to understand the true impact of technology on privacy-and,
more specifically, in order to accurately gauge the effect of new
surveillance technology on the balance between individual privacy and
government investigatory power-the first step is to evaluate how
technology has changed the amount of privacy in society for everyday
citizens. As in any context in which we are examining the effects of
technology on society, the changes tend to be subtle and incremental in the
short term, but dramatic and momentous in the long run. In the field of
medicine, for example, each new drug or surgical technique might have a
small influence on the way a certain disease is treated-but the cumulative
effect of all of these advances has increased life expectancy in this country
from around forty-seven to seventy-eight over the past one hundred years.24
Likewise, the effect of new technologies on our privacy in everyday
life is easy to overlook, since we quickly adapt to the small gains that are
made and fail to notice how fundamentally our lives are changing. By
taking a broader perspective, however, we can see how new technology has
dramatically increased the amount of privacy each of us now enjoys in our
lives.
24 In 1900, life expectancy at birth was only forty-seven years. NAT'L CTR. FOR HEALTH
STATISTICS, HEALTH, UNITED STATES, 2006 167 tbl.27 (2005), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/hus05.pdf#027. Life expectancy in the year 2004 was
nearly seventy-eight years. See ARIALDI M. MININO ET AL., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL,
DEATHS PRELIMINARY DATA (2004), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/products/pubs/
pubd/hestats/prelimdeaths04/preliminarydeaths04.htm.
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To better visualize this broad perspective, let us engage in a time-travel
thought experiment. Assume that Sally and Harry, two residents of early
nineteenth century America, wish to have a private communication with
each other. As it turns out, their options are limited. Sally could invite
Harry to her home-though of course anyone could see Harry entering and
leaving Sally's home, so the fact that they were conversing would be public
knowledge. Sally could write Harry a letter, but again the name of the
person with whom she was communicating would be open to the world.
More troubling would be the fact that-assuming there was no legal
impediment-any government agent wishing to know the content of her
communication could intercept and read the mail before it got to its
destination.
Now assume that Sally and Harry live in 1950. The technological
advance of the telephone 25 has greatly increased their chances of having a
private conversation. Casual observers of their affairs will have no idea that
the two of them are talking, much less what they are talking about. But
although the telephone is an improvement, it is not foolproof. They can
only use the telephone at certain locations-their home, their office,
perhaps a quasi-public phone booth. Furthermore, the local telephone
operator might be listening in on their phone conversation.26 Almost all
residential lines are party lines, which each have to share with up to ten
other households-and any member of any of those households could be
eavesdropping on their conversation without their knowledge.27 And once
again (assuming no legal restrictions exist), government agents could
subpoena phone records to determine whom Sally is calling, or set up a
device to tap Sally's phone.28 It should be noted, however, that these
actions by the government require substantially more effort and technical
expertise than simply looking at Sally's outgoing and incoming mail.29
25 See infra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
26 California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 54 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (suggesting
that an operator can listen in on telephone conversations).
27 See Privateline.com Telephone History: Party Line Service,
http://www.privateline.com/TelephoneHistory5/partyline.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2007).
28 See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (discussing the use of
wiretaps as early as 1928); N.Y. Times Co. v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2006)
(discussing the constitutionality of subpoenaing a reporter's phone records from a third
party).
29 For example, one problem police sometimes encounter when intercepting a phone call
is converting the communication to a digital signal, which requires the use of sophisticated
software. See Larry Downes, Electronic Communications and the Plain View Exception:
More "Bad Physics," 7 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 239, 241 n.9 (1994). There is obviously no need
for such technology when intercepting and reading mail.
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Finally, assume that Sally and Harry live in the modem world. Now
they can communicate with each other from almost any spot in the country
using cell phones, with no chance of a human operator casually
eavesdropping on their conversation. They can also send e-mails or instant
messages to each other from their computers. And if they are very worried
about privacy, they can easily take measures to make their conversation
even more secure. A cell phone can be bought and used for a day and then
discarded, making the calls much more difficult to trace. 30 E-mail can be
sent and received to and from anonymous accounts, or the two individuals
could purchase an inexpensive encryption program which would shield
their e-mail communications from even the most sophisticated government
code breakers.31
Of course, the government has been able to find ways to intercept
electronic communications-but this in itself does not mean that the new
technology has led to a decrease in privacy. A modem-day Sally and Harry
still have all the old ways of communicating with each other-they can still
visit each other's houses, send each other mail, or call each other on land-
based phone lines. In other words, technology has given them more ways
30 In response to this practice, federal and state governments have passed laws making it
easier for law enforcement to track and wiretap telephone calls from such "disposable"
phones. See generally Charles H. Kennedy & Peter P. Swire, State Wiretaps and Electronic
Surveillance After September 11, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 971, 980-82 (2003) (discussing the
proliferation of new state and federal laws which allow for "roving wiretaps"). In the past,
wiretap warrants applied only to a specific phone line. Id. at 980. Thus, use of disposable
cell phones could render such warrants useless because a criminal could have moved on to
another phone before law enforcement obtained a warrant to wiretap the previous phone.
However, in 1986, so-called "roving" wiretaps were authorized for domestic surveillance
under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act. Id. at 981; see also Electronic
Communications Privacy Act, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986); 18 U.S.C. § 2518
(2000). A roving wiretap warrant permits surveillance of "any communications device a
target of an investigation is likely to use, without specifying the telephone or other facilities
in the orders or applications." Kennedy & Swire, supra, at 980-81. Essentially, a roving
wiretap wiretaps the person, rather than the phone. The PATRIOT Act extended such roving
wiretap authority to foreign intelligence investigations and now allows such a wiretap order
to apply nationwide, rather than simply in the district in which the authorizing judge sits. Id.
at 981-82; see also Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, §§ 206,
216(a), 115 Stat. 272, 282, 288 (2001). Although these statutes assist law enforcement in
tracking and wiretapping disposable phones, they are not perfect. Law enforcement would
still need to discover what disposable phone a terrorist is using or would be likely to use
before a roving wiretap would be of any use.
31 See Charles Barry Smith, Current U.S. Encryption Regulations: A Federal Law
Enforcement Perspective, 3 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 11, 15-16 (2000) (describing
encryption technology and criminals' and terrorists' use of such technology to evade law
enforcement).
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to communicate; more options to choose from in deciding which method of.
communicating is the most secure.
In addition, the economic effects of new technologies must be
considered, since in discussing the effect of technology on privacy, we
should not look at the amount of privacy a person has in theory, but the
amount they have (or used to have) in practice. In 1800, a face-to-face visit
was extremely difficult to set up because most people lived in rural areas
that were great distances apart, and so travel between residences took
considerably longer than it does today. Those who lived in urban areas
could more easily travel to see each other-but nineteenth century cities
were difficult places to find privacy, as most individuals lived in apartments
or tenements which were shared with many other family members. As has
been true throughout history, the very rich-enjoying private residences
and easy access to transportation-could engage in private conversations
without a problem, but for the vast majority of citizens, private
communications were difficult to come by.
The telephone was invented in 1876,32 but in the early twentieth
century, it was still a rare device, used only by those wealthy enough to
afford them.33 By the 1950s, the telephone was more commonplace, but
almost no home had more than one phone line, and many residences still
had none.34 Today, nearly 70% of Americans have their own personal
telephone which they carry with them everywhere 35-cellular phones are so
inexpensive that they are prevalent among every economic class36-and
32 Catherine J. Lanctot, Attorney-Client Relationships in Cyberspace: The Peril and the
Promise, 49 DUKE L.J. 147, 162 n.34 (1999) (citing U.S. Patent No. 174,465 (issued Mar. 7,
1876)).
33 In the early part of the twentieth century, only 1.5 million Americans had telephones.
Id. Even by the beginning of World War II, fewer than half of Americans had telephones.
Id. Cost may have been part of the cause of the rarity of telephones. See Susan W. Brenner,
Law in an Era of Pervasive Technology, 15 WIDENER L.J. 667, 714-15, n.289 (2006).
Telephone companies attempted to increase the pervasiveness of telephones in the early
twentieth century by cutting the service cost in half so more Americans could afford them.
Id.
34 As late as 1985, there was only one residential phone line for every three citizens, and
fewer than one residential phone line per household. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES tbls.2, 57 & 1131 (2007), http://www.census.gov/
compendia/statab/. Census records show that there were 79 million residential phone lines
for a population of about 85 million households and 238 million people. Id.
35 As of 2005, 207 million Americans owned cell phones. Id. at tbl.1 132. This
represented 70% of the total population of the United States that year (296 million), and 75%
of the total population of the United States over five years old (276 million). Id. at tbl.21.
36 In fact, many cell phones themselves are free when the individual purchases a service
plan. See, e.g., Amazon.com: Cingular, http://www.amazon.com/s/103-3259454-8491016?
ie=UTF8&index=wireless-phones&field-vendorcode=Cingular (last visited Apr. 21, 2007).
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those that do not have a cell phone almost certainly have access to a
traditional telephone. In short, advancing technology has not only given us
devices which dramatically increase our privacy, but has also made these
devices affordable to almost everyone.
The same analysis can be applied to most other categories of privacy.
Take data storage: a nineteenth century diary writer would have very
limited options as to how to secretly record and store his writings. In
modem times, the diary could be written on a laptop computer, accessible
only to someone with the password-or stored on a hard drive the size of a
pen and hidden almost anywhere. More broadly, the rise of the personal
computer and the Internet has allowed individuals to stay in the privacy of
their own home to conduct many activities which formerly had to be done
in public. An individual today can browse and shop online for any item she
might want, from clothing to cooking utensils to pornography; 37 she can
access and download almost any kind of picture, political treatise, song, or
book; 38 she can even "develop" her own digital pictures, insert them into a
pamphlet she is writing, and print multiple copies of the pamphlet for
distribution later.39 Only twenty years ago, almost any of these tasks would
require the average person to leave her home and personally visit any
number of other businesses; it was impossible to browse through and
purchase a book without leaving your home, while developing your own
pictures and printing your own pamphlet at home was possible only with
expensive and unwieldy equipment.
In short, one of the primary effects of technology on society over the
past two hundred years has been to increase the amount of privacy in our
everyday lives. Individuals-including criminals-can now conduct many
more activities secretly, particularly activities which involve
communicating, storing, or processing information. This increased secrecy
has posed a problem for law enforcement officials, who have responded by
developing and using special technology to conduct their surveillance.
III. ADVANCES IN SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY
With this understanding of the overall effect of technological
advancements on privacy as a backdrop, we will now turn to the more
traditional concept of the relationship between technology and privacy: the
threat to privacy posed by modern surveillance technology. This Article
37 See, e.g., Amazon.com, http://www.amazon.com/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2007).
38 See, e.g., Apple-iTunes, http://www.apple.com/itunes/store/ (last visited Apr. 21,
2007).
39 See, e.g., Apple.mac, http://www.apple.com/dotmac/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2007)
(describing the software iLife).
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will divide modem surveillance technology into three categories: (1)
devices that allow government to see things it could never see before; (2)
technology that allows governments to conduct more traditional
surveillance more efficiently; and (3) "responsive" surveillance technology,
which the government has been forced to use in order to keep up with new
privacy-enhancing technologies.
A. THE ORWELLIAN NIGHTMARE: TECHNOLOGY AS THE ENEMY OF
PRIVACY
The conventional wisdom is undeniably correct in one aspect:
surveillance technology has vastly improved over the past century, giving
the government valuable tools to investigate potential criminals, but also
creating new challenges for the legislatures and the courts as they struggle
to determine how (if at all) the new technologies should be regulated.
Perhaps the most frightening type of surveillance technology involves
devices which allow the government to see, hear, or gather information that
would otherwise be impossible for it to detect. Specifically, electronic
eavesdropping devices and hidden cameras can now be installed in homes
or offices to see and hear what people are doing in their most private
places.40  If agents are not able to get inside a home or office, parabolic
microphones are available that can listen to conversations through a
window from a significant distance.4 1 Meanwhile, outside the home, hand-
held detectors can "see" through clothing and provide an outline of every
item the subject is carrying.4 2 Nearly every cell phone in use today is
40 See Charles B. Craver, Privacy Issues Affecting Employers, Employees, and Labor
Organizations, 66 LA. L. REV. 1057, 1068-70 (2006) (discussing employees' potential
statutory protection from employers' use of hidden cameras in private places, such as
lavatories or locker rooms, and hidden microphones that pick up conversations between co-
workers); Daniel R. Dinger, Should Parents Be Allowed to Record a Child's Telephone
Conversations When They Believe the Child Is in Danger?: An Examination of the Federal
Wiretap Statute and the Doctrine of Vicarious Consent in the Context of a Criminal
Prosecution, 28 SEATrLE U. L. REV. 955, 968-89 (2005) (discussing the legality of parental
electronic recording of children's telephone calls in the home); see also Shana K. Rahavy,
The Federal Wiretap Act: The Permissible Scope of Eavesdropping in the Family Home, 2 J.
HIGH TECH. L. 87, 95-98 (2003).
41 See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 712 (1984) (describing a parabolic
microphone as "capable of picking up conversations in nearby homes"); United States v.
Infelise, No. 90 CR 87, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17174, at *17 n.1 (N.D. I11. Oct. 18, 1991)
("A parabolic microphone is a portable device that allows the listener to eavesdrop on all
conversations that come within the range of the microphone."); Daniel J. Solove,
Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1264, 1265 (2004)
("[P]arabolic microphones can record conversations at long distances.").
42 See David A. Harris, Superman 's X-Ray Vision and the Fourth Amendment: The New
Gun Detection Technology, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 7-13 (1996) (describing the development of
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required to contain a GPS-based locator device, so that emergency
responders can locate a 911 caller-but the location information may also
be available to government agents for other purposes.43 Ion scanners can be
waved over any surface to detect the presence of drugs or explosives;
44
airplanes fly over our fenced-in fields, allowing law enforcement agents to
view our backyards;45 and satellites in space can take pictures of these
backyards with a stunning level of detail.46 Finally, law enforcement agents
are compiling vast and growing DNA databases, which allow them not only
to determine if a certain individual was present at a certain crime scene, but
also to identify sensitive and personal health information about the
individuals who are catalogued in the database.
The effect of this category of surveillance technology on our personal
privacy is unambiguously negative. Not only can government agents see
and hear things that were formerly impossible to see and hear, but most of
the time when they do so, we are unaware of the surveillance. Unlike a
traditional search of our home or our person, during which we can see the
agents rifling through our belongings or feel them patting down our
clothing, we have no idea when hidden video cameras or microphones are
recording our actions or conversations. This combination of increased
intrusiveness and the potentially hidden nature of the surveillance has
fueled much of the concern over the effect of technology on privacy, and
has in some cases led to tight legal restrictions on the use of some of these
surveillance methods.48
portable detectors which can "see" through clothing from a distance to detect guns); see also
Steven G. Brandl, Back to the Future: The Implications of September 11, 2001 on Law
Enforcement Practice and Policy, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRiM. L. 133, 149 (2003) (noting the use of
low level x-rays that facilitate detection of weapons, explosives, drugs, and contraband under
clothing).
43 See Thomas Lee, supra note 21, 381-87.
44 See Heather K. McShain, Not Quite Bradbury's Fahrenheit 451: The Uncertain Future
of Sense-Enhancing Technology in the Aftermath of United States v. Kyllo, 105 W. VA. L.
REV. 1, 44 nn.229-30 (2002).
45 See, e.g., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
46 Ross Kerber, Privacy: When Is a Satellite Photo an Unreasonable Search?, WALL ST.
J., Jan. 27, 1998, at BI (describing some of the detail of satellite photos); see also Mark
Morford, I Can See Your House From Here; Google's Close-Up Satellite Photo Maps are
Way Creepy, But in a Very Cool Way, S.F. GATE, Apr. 8, 2005, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?file=/gate/archive/2005/4/8/notesO40805.DTL (describing the detailed
satellite photo technology now available to ordinary citizens through www.google.com).
47 See generally Seth F. Kreimer, Truth Machines and Consequences: The Light and
Dark Sides of "Accuracy" in Criminal Justice, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURv. AM. L. 655 (2005).
48 See infra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 97
WHY 2007 IS NOT LIKE 1984
B. TECHNOLOGY WHICH IMPROVES THE EFFICIENCY OF
SURVEILLANCE
Surveillance technologies in the first category invade our private space
to gather information which government agents would otherwise be unable
to gain access to without conducting an intrusive search of our homes or our
bodies. In contrast, the second category of privacy-infringing surveillance
technology are devices which merely allow law enforcement officers to
process already public information more quickly and efficiently-for
example, cameras in public spaces that allow one officer to monitor many
different locations at once,4 9 or location tracking technology that allows law
enforcement to determine the location of anyone in a public area.50  In
practice, the distinction is sometimes a subtle one-indeed, the same
technology (such as ion scanners, airplane flyovers, and location tracking
devices) can be used to gather information from private or public spaces.
Furthermore, individuals being watched by cameras or traced by secret
homing devices may feel that their privacy is being infringed upon
regardless of whether they are in a public or a private place. But as we will
see later, the distinction is a critical one for the legal system.
A good example of this hyper-efficient public surveillance is facial
recognition technology. This technology involves installing numerous
cameras at a public event or in airports and taking thousands of pictures of
all the individuals who pass by.5' The pictures are then passed through a
computer which compares the facial features of each individual to pictures
of known fugitives, using standard biometric measurements (such as size of
mouth, distance between the eyes, and angle of nose).52 In theory, this
technology would allow law enforcement to scan through thousands of
faces in a crowd and alert officers on the ground to the presence of any
known fugitives that might be present 3 As long as the surveillance is only
conducted in public places, however, it really is doing no more than what
police officers could have done on their own without the technology-
scanning faces in crowds and comparing them to pictures of known
suspects. The use of the technology simply makes the surveillance more
49 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
50 See infra note 70 and accompanying text.
51 See American Civil Liberties Union: Q&A on Face-Recognition, http://aclu.org/
privacy/spying/14875res20030902.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2007).
52 Id.
53 See id. However, in practice, the technology has not been particularly effective so far.
See id. For example, in the 2001 Super Bowl at Tampa Bay, of the tens of thousands of
individuals scanned, only nineteen were flagged, and some of them were false positives. Id.
Numerous studies have shown that the technology fails to identify target individuals if the
camera angle has changed, or if the target has grown or shaved facial hair. Id.
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efficient, allowing this type of surveillance to occur with a smaller outlay of
human resources.
Other examples of this category of surveillance include more efficient
ways of gathering public information-mining public data from the
Internet, for example, or placing a homing beacon on someone's car to track
its movements on the public highway.54 Without using this technology, a
law enforcement officer could gather the same information by traveling to
all the appropriate government offices and copying down a suspect's tax
records, property records, and so on. Likewise, a team of law enforcement
officers could follow the suspect's car twenty-four hours a day to keep track
of his movements. But conducting this type of surveillance the old-
fashioned way would require such a great allocation of resources that it
would not be feasible for most investigations. Technology makes these
formerly labor-intensive searches feasible for a much broader category of
crimes.
Of course, these hyper-efficient technologies might also be used to
monitor private information instead of public information. A homing
device could easily be used to monitor someone's whereabouts inside their
home, or a computer program could be designed to sift through every single
e-mail sent by certain suspects. In these situations, the surveillance would
fall into both the second category and either of the other two categories, and
(perhaps) require different treatment under the law.
C. GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TO PRIVACY-ENHANCING TECHNOLOGY
As noted in Section II, the primary effect of new technology over the
past century has been to dramatically increase the privacy of everyday
citizens, by giving them more private ways to communicate and more
secure ways to store and encrypt data, and by vastly increasing the breadth
and scope of activities that can be accomplished within their own homes.
Unfortunately, what has been good for individual privacy has also been
good for criminals. Sally and Harry may not be sending love letters but
instead may be planning to blow up a government building; the diary writer
might be trying to hide illicit financial information in order to cheat on his
taxes; the computer user may not simply be shopping for a book or printing
up a pamphlet, but could also be trying to hack into secure databases, send
child pornography, or print counterfeit checks. So, as technology has
enabled individuals to live more private and secret lives, the government
has been forced to turn to new surveillance technologies which enable them
to investigate individuals using privacy-enhancing technology.
54 See infra note 70 and accompanying text.
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When looked at in this light, much of the new surveillance
technologies used by the government over the past century shows that the
state is constantly playing catch-up, trying to find new ways to overcome
the increased use of privacy-enhancing technology by those conducting
criminal activity. Conspirators who do not want to meet in public or risk
sending letters through the mail can communicate by cell phone or e-mail,
forcing the government to combat this technological concealment by
attempting to tap the telephone transmission or intercept the e-mail.
Criminals who want to conceal child pornography, fraudulent financial
documents, or any other large volume of data no longer need to find
warehouses or storage units to stash their boxes-they can simply use
digital data (or scan and then destroy the existing hard copies) and stash it,
perhaps in encrypted form, on a very small storage device. And just as
innocent people can buy a book or print out their own pamphlet from their
bedroom, crimes which once required sophisticated equipment and multiple
co-conspirators, such as counterfeiting or producing of child pornography,
can now be committed by a lone individual inside his home, where he
receives the maximum protection available under the Fourth Amendment.
This category of "responsive surveillance" includes many of the more
sophisticated surveillance technologies that are intended to intercept
electronic communications-tracing telephone calls, tapping into phone
lines, and intercepting or retrieving e-mails. This category also includes
searches of more sophisticated storage techniques-such as creating and
sifting through a bitstream copy of a suspect's hard drive. And it could
conceivably include more aggressive surveillance measures that
government agents employ in order to combat the wider and more
dangerous array of criminal activity that might be taking place inside a
home.
One example of these more aggressive measures is the recent case of
Kyllo v. United States, in which government agents used a thermal imager
to detect marijuana-growing heat lamps inside a suspect's home.5 5 If
Danny Lee Kyllo had sought to grow marijuana one hundred years ago, he
would have been forced to do so outdoors in a field, where it could be seen
by others. Even if Kyllo had attempted to hide the marijuana by locating
the plants far inside his property,56 concealed by trees or other crops, the
55 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29-30 (2001).
56 This hypothetical assumes the counterfactual premise that possession of marijuana was
illegal one hundred years ago. In fact, possession of marijuana was legal in this country until
the first states began to outlaw it in the second decade of the twentieth century. The federal
government did not outlaw marijuana use until the 1930s. See generally Richard J. Bonnie
& Charles H. Whitebread, II, The Forbidden Fruit and the Tree of Knowledge: An Inquiry
into the Legal History ofAmerican Marijuana Prohibition, 56 VA. L. REv. 971, 1010 (1970).
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Fourth Amendment did not prevent a law enforcement agent from venturing
onto the property-even if he were trespassing-to view the marijuana.57
Thus, the Kyllo case is an example of a defendant using technology-high-
powered heat lamps-in order to better conceal his illegal actions, and the
government then using another new technology-thermal imagers-in an
attempt to counter the defendant's concealment.
58
As the Kyllo example indicates, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish
between the use of this "responsive" surveillance technology, and the first
category of surveillance technology, which enables government agents to
see, hear, or in some way gather information that they otherwise could not
detect. Certainly, without modem technology, law enforcement officers
could not listen in on our phone conversations, track our e-mails, search our
hard drives, or measure the amount of heat emerging from our homes. But
without modem technology to enable these activities in the first place, the
suspects' conduct could be monitored using traditional surveillance
methods. This distinction is important if we are examining how technology
has altered the balance between privacy and criminal investigation, since
the first category of surveillance technology unequivocally decreases
privacy and increases the power of the state to investigate, while the
responsive surveillance technology's effect on the balance is far more
ambiguous. The distinction also matters legally, since courts and
legislatures find it relatively easy to regulate surveillance technology that
empowers state agents to do what was otherwise impossible, but tend to
struggle when trying to regulate surveillance technology that is only useful
in overcoming privacy-enhancing technology. 59
Finally, it should be noted that in at least one area--encryption-
privacy-enhancing technology has become so advanced that the
government's attempts to catch up have proven futile. That is, there is no
type of responsive surveillance technology that can be used to counteract
the greater privacy enjoyed by individuals (including criminals) who make
a serious effort to encrypt their communications. 60 As Professor Orin Kerr
noted in a recent article, "[I]t becomes clear that the government will be
The first federal statute outlawing marijuana was the Marijuana Tax Act of 1937. See
Marijuana Tax Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-238, 50 Stat. 551 (1937) (repealed 1970).
57 See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179-81 (1984); Hester v. United States, 265
U.S. 57, 59 (1924).
58 It is interesting to note that the thermal imager at issue in Kyllo did not actually detect
the marijuana itself, but merely the technological device that the defendant used in order to
grow the marijuana. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 29-30.
59 See infra notes 75-106 and accompanying text.
60 See Kerr, New Technologies, supra note 19, at 530 (discussing the near impossibility
of decrypting some complicated encrypted communications).
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technically unable to decrypt any encrypted communication that is
encrypted with anything other than a very short key, and that the decryption
of even a short key would consume extraordinary amounts of government
resources." 6' Thus, private communications for the sophisticated criminal
are all but guaranteed, regardless of what methods the government uses to
try to acquire the information.
IV. THE CURRENT LEGAL REGIME REGULATING GOVERNMENT
SURVEILLANCE POWER
New technologies of any kind pose a challenge for policymakers and
courts. When legislators are regulating the use of a new technology, they
need to determine the many different ways that the technology is being used
in society, and which of those various uses are beneficial to society and
which are not.62 Similarly, judges frequently need to apply old law to a new
technology, and in doing so, they must analogize between the uses of the
61 Id. The technological advantage the encoder holds over the codebreaker is based on
the fact that sophisticated codes are only decipherable with the encryption key. See id. This
key is a series of binary numbers-generally hundreds of binary numbers strung together.
See id. In order to decipher the code, the codebreaker must try every single possible key one
at a time. See id. This is not so difficult for a key which is 4 or 8 binary numbers long
(since there are only 16 or 256 possible keys, respectively). But every time the encoder adds
another digit to the string of numbers, she doubles the number of potential keys that have to
be tested by the codebreaker-thus easily reaching a number of potential keys beyond the
capabilities of even the fastest supercomputer to try in any reasonable amount of time. See
id. at 529-30. Kerr gives the example of a code using a key that was 128 digits long (thus
creating 3.4 x 1038 possible keys), which would "take a supercomputer several million
years" to decipher. Id. at 530. Even if supercomputers become sixteen times faster over the
next few years, the encoder need only add four more digits to the key in order to keep the
supercomputer busy for the same amount of time.
62 The long-running debate about how to regulate the Internet (if at all) is a good
example of the problem that new technology poses to policymakers. See, e.g., David B.
Brushwood, Responsive Regulation of Internet Pharmacy Practice, 10 ANNALS HEALTH L.
75 (2001); Paul Ehrlich, Cyberlaw: Regulating Conduct on the Internet: Communications
Decency Act § 230, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 401 (2002); Christine Hurt, Regulating Public
Morals and Private Markets: Online Securities Trading, Internet Gambling, and the
Speculation Paradox, 86 B.U. L. REV. 371 (2006); C. Dianne Martin & Joseph M. Reagle,
An Alternative to Government Regulation and Censorship: Content Advisory Systems for the
Internet, 15 CARDozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 409 (1997); Alanna C. Rutherford, Sporty's Farm v.
Sportsman's Market: A Case Study in Internet Regulation Gone Awry, 66 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 421 (2000); Joel Sanders, The Regulation of Indecent Material Accessible to Children
on the Internet: Is It Really Alright to Yell Fire in a Crowded Chat Room?, 39 CATH. LAW.
125 (1999). The Internet can be put to many different uses, mostly good, and some very
bad. Effective regulation can only come about when lawmakers reach a consensus as to
which uses are desirable and which are not.
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new technology and more traditional activities which are expressly covered
by the statute or by precedents.
63
In this sense, our first and most unsettling category of surveillance
technology has been the easiest for the legal system to adapt to. When
government agents use new technology to gather information that has
traditionally been considered private, legislatures generally step in to
strictly regulate the activity, and in the absence of any express statute,
courts will tend to apply the Fourth Amendment and bar the use of such
technologies without a warrant. For example, Congress has barred the use
of electronic eavesdropping devices unless government agents obtain a Title
III order, which requires a greater showing than the probable cause
requirement for obtaining a search warrant.64 And after an inconsistent start
during which the Supreme Court struggled to refine its Fourth Amendment
doctrine,65 in 1967 the Court decided Katz v. United States, which held that
electronic eavesdropping violated the Fourth Amendment.66  Katz
established the "reasonable expectation of privacy" standard, essentially
holding that if a surveillance device is gathering traditionally private
information, its use will be subject to Fourth Amendment regulation.
67
Similarly, in the absence of statutory guidance, lower courts have
consistently applied the Fourth Amendment to video surveillance of private
areas.
68
63 See, e.g., Kyllo, 533 U.S. 27 (analyzing the constitutionality of thermal imagers by
comparing them to older technologies and precedents); Kerr, Fourth Amendment in
Cyberspace, supra note 19, at 513-19 (using Supreme Court and Circuit Court precedent to
argue that the government does not violate the Fourth Amendment when it decrypts
ciphertext); Edward Lee, Rules and Standards for Cyberspace, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REv.
1275, 1281-84 (2002) (discussing problems with applying old law to new technologies); see
also infra notes 65-106 and accompanying text.
' 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (2000). In order to obtain a Title III order, the government must
show that: (1) normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed, are unlikely
to succeed, or are dangerous; (2) the surveillance will be conducted in a way that minimizes
the interception of irrelevant information; and (3) there is probable cause to believe that the
interception will reveal evidence of one of a list of specific predicate crimes. Id. § 2518(3),
(5). The order must be authorized by a high-level Justice Department official and signed by
a federal judge, and is limited to thirty days. Id. § 2516 (2000 & Supp. III 2003); id. § 2518.
65 See, e.g., United States v. Silverman, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961) (holding that a "spike-
mike" which produced the same result as Goldman's Dictaphone was a search because it
touched the property of the defendant); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 135 (1942)
(deciding that a Dictaphone placed against a wall adjoining the defendant's office was not a
"search" because the government agents did not trespass onto the defendant's property).
66 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-53 (1967).
67 Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
68 See, e.g., United States v. Koyomejian, 970 F.2d 536, 542 (9th Cir. 1992); United
States v. Biasucci, 786 F.2d 504, 510 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875,
883 (7th Cir. 1984).
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The only real dilemma that these new technologies pose for courts and
legislators is whether the highly intrusive and potentially secret nature of
these types of surveillance should lead them to create even greater
restrictions against their use than they do for traditional searches. As noted
above, the requirements for obtaining a Title III order authorizing the use of
electronic listening devices is much higher than the standard for obtaining a
search warrant, and federal courts have held that the Fourth Amendment
imposes an identical standard for video surveillance.69
Thus, the law has kept pace with the first category of surveillance
technology, recognizing these searches as hyper-intrusive and imposing
extra requirements on government agents before they can use such devices.
The second category of surveillance technology--devices that allow
government agents to gather public information more efficiently-has been
treated quite differently. The courts have essentially applied Katz and
concluded that since there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in public
activity, the Fourth Amendment does not apply to a surveillance of public
areas, regardless of the method used to conduct the surveillance. Thus, law
enforcement agents can attach a homing device to contraband and
electronically trace a suspect along all the public roads on which he
drives-but if he takes the contraband inside his private home, the agents
may not continue to trace its whereabouts without a warrant.7 0 Likewise,
law enforcement agents do not need a warrant to conduct photographic or
video surveillance of public areas because individuals have no reasonable
expectation of privacy in public.7 1 Finally, planes and even helicopters can
fly over private fields searching for contraband, since the content of those
fields is visible to the public from commercial airliners.72
The Court's decision not to apply the Fourth Amendment to any kind
of surveillance of public areas has drawn its share of criticism. 73  But
although the Court may sometimes show questionable judgment in deciding
when an individual does or does not have a "reasonable expectation of
privacy" (the flyover cases come to mind),74 the rule itself is a sound one
69 See, e.g., Torres, 751 F.2d at 883-85.
70 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282 (1983).
71 See Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968).
72 See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450-52 (1989); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207,
213-15 (1986).
73 See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, Camera Surveillance of Public Places and the Right to
Anonymity, 72 Miss. L.J. 213 (2002) (arguing that courts should interpret the Fourth
Amendment to recognize the right to be free from video surveillance in public, and
suggesting that courts should set up some guidelines for the use of such surveillance).
74 Arguably the flyover cases misinterpret the "reasonable expectations" test-just
because a new technology (in this case airplanes) has made it possible for everyday civilians
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since the Katz doctrine leads inevitably to the conclusion that the Fourth
Amendment is silent if surveillance takes place in public. There are really
only two other options, both of which require abandoning the Katz test.
Courts could apply the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirements to all
public surveillance-even to a police officer observing illegal activity
firsthand on a public street-but this would be an absurd rule. But the only
other option would be for courts to distinguish between different kinds of
technology that are used during the surveillance, and it is difficult to find a
principled reason for any such distinction. Presumably a law enforcement
agent could use a flashlight or a set of binoculars without needing a
warrant; would a warrant be required if the officer used a video camera or a
satellite to monitor public activity? At what point would the public
observation be considered a "search" under the Fourth Amendment? And
more importantly, why would the police officer's observations of a public
activity ever be considered a "search"? Instead of installing one hundred
video cameras throughout a public park, the police could hire one hundred
extra police officers and station them in exactly the same locations.
Although this would arguably be more intrusive than the cameras (and
certainly more expensive for taxpayers), the hundred officers would gather
the same information, and their presence would clearly be permissible
under the Fourth Amendment.
Thus, courts and legislatures have found it relatively easy to deal with
the first two categories of new surveillance technologies. Not surprisingly,
it is the third category-remedial surveillance methods to counteract the
vast array of privacy-enhancing technologies used by everyday citizens-
which has given courts and legislators the most problems. There are at least
two reasons for this difficulty: first, the difficulty in finding the proper
analogy within traditional forms of surveillance; and second, the difficulty
of determining and then maintaining the proper balance between privacy
and law enforcement needs in an entirely new context.
Unlike the first category of modem surveillance, in which it is
relatively easy to link the new technology to a traditional form of
to fly over fields and see what is growing in them does not mean that the new technology has
changed society to the extent that it has changed our reasonable expectations about what
information is private. Airplanes can be contrasted with electric lighting, which not only
makes observation of activities at nighttime possible but also routine and commonplace
(unlike flying over fields and looking down into them, which is possible but hardly routine
or commonplace). Thus, it would be fair to say we no longer have a reasonable expectation
of privacy in what we do at night in public, but we should still have a reasonable expectation
of privacy in the contents of our fenced-in fields. See Ric Simmons, From Katz to Kyllo: A
Blueprint for Adapting the Fourth Amendment to Twenty-First Century Technologies, 53
HASTINGs L.J. 1303, 1332-35 (2002).
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surveillance, courts struggle to determine similar analogies for responsive
technologies-and occasionally, they choose an analogy that is disastrously
inappropriate. This is because it is not clear at first how society itself views
the privacy-enhancing technology-in the words of Katz, do we have a
"reasonable expectation of privacy" when we use a certain technology to
communicate, store data, or conduct certain activities in our home? And if
we do, what showing should the government be forced to demonstrate
before invading that privacy?
The most infamous example of a court's failure to understand this third
category of surveillance technology came nearly eighty years ago, when the
Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of wiretapping telephones
in Olmstead v. United States. 5 Here was a classic case of responsive
government surveillance: the telephone had been around for over fifty
years, and it was by then commonly used by individuals to communicate
private messages from the sanctuary of their own homes. Unsurprisingly,
criminals such as Olmstead were also able to use this new technology to
hide their activities from government investigators more effectively. 7 6 In
response, law enforcement agents began using their own kind of new
technology-an instrument that could be connected to the telephone wires
outside a person's home and allow the user to eavesdrop on the
conversation. The Court, in evaluating this responsive technology, had no
obvious pre-technology analogy to fall back on-when an individual uses a
telephone, should he be treated as though he sent a sealed letter from his
house to another individual? Or should he be treated as though he were
speaking privately to another individual in his private home? Or should he
be treated as though he was standing on his rooftop, shouting his message
to an individual miles away? To us today, the answer may seem obvious,
" 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
76 The Olmstead case itself involved a vast conspiracy of seventy-two individuals who
were importing and selling liquor in violation of Prohibition. Id. The Supreme Court noted
that the conspiracy was of an "amazing magnitude":
[The conspiracy] involved the employment of not less than 50 persons, of two sea-going vessels
for the transportation of liquor to British Columbia, of smaller vessels for coastwise
transportation to the state of Washington, the purchase and use of a branch beyond the suburban
limits of Seattle, with a large underground cache for storage and a number of smaller caches in
that city, the maintenance of a central office manned with operators, and the employment of
executives, salesmen, deliverymen dispatchers, scouts, bookkeepers, collectors, and an attorney.
In a bad month sales amounted to $176,000; the aggregate for a year must have exceeded
$2,000,000.
Id. at 456. Olmstead himself was the "leading conspirator and the general manager" of the
business. Id. Given the geographic scope and the number of personnel involved in the
conspiracy, there is no doubt that the telephone assisted Olmstead greatly both in carrying
out his criminal actions and in concealing these actions from law enforcement.
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but the Court took some time to determine to what, exactly, telephone
conversations and wiretapping were analogous.
First, the Court considered and rejected the analogy to a sealed letter,
noting that there was a "constitutional provision for the Postoffice
Department," and the government had a relationship with "those who pay to
secure protection of their sealed letters. 77 Thus,
It is plainly within the words of the [Fourth] [A]mendment to say that the unlawful
rifling by a government agent of a sealed letter is a search and seizure of the sender's
papers or effects. The letter is a paper, an effect and in the custody of a government
that forbids carriage, except under its protection.
So was the interception of the phone call akin to entering the house
and eavesdropping on a conversation between two people inside the house?
The Supreme Court rejected this analogy as well since the law enforcement
agents never went inside the house itself:
Neither the cases we have cited nor any of the many federal decisions brought to our
attention hold the Fourth Amendment to have been violated as against a defendant,
unless there has been an official search and seizure of his person or such a seizure of
his papers or his tangible material effects or an actual physical invasion of his house
"or curtilage" for the purpose of making a seizure.
7 9
Thus, the only analogy left was that of the individual broadcasting his
telephone communication to the world with no expectation of privacy: "The
reasonable view is that one who installs in his house a telephone instrument
with connecting wires intends to project his voice to those quite outside,
and that the wires beyond his house, and messages while passing over them,
are not within the protection of the Fourth Amendment.,
80
Congress eventually stepped in to protect telephone conversations
from unregulated government wiretapping, 8' but the damage done by the
Court's poor choice of analogy continued. The focus on property rights that
laid the foundation for Olmstead muddled the Court's analysis in later cases
involving first-category surveillance technology like electronic
eavesdropping devices. 82  It was ultimately a first-category surveillance
case-Katz v. United States-in which the Court was finally able to set out
7 Id. at 464.
78 id.
71 Id. at 466.
80 id.
81 See Federal Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 605 (2000).
82 See supra note 65.
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a coherent doctrine for dealing with surveillance technology and the Fourth
Amendment.83
But even in the post-Katz era, third-category surveillance technologies
continue to give the Court problems. In 1979, the Court decided Smith v.
Maryland,84 another case in which the Court faced government use of
responsive surveillance to counteract a criminal's use of privacy-enhancing
technology. On March 5, 1976, Michael Smith robbed Patricia
McDonough in Baltimore.85 After the robbery, Smith began calling
McDonough at her home, threatening her and using obscene language.
86
The police were able to trace Smith's license plate number, but still needed
more evidence to link him to the various crimes.87 Consequently, the police
requested that the telephone company install a pen register on Smith's
telephone line.88 This device does not eavesdrop on the subject's telephone
conversations, but instead merely records the phone numbers dialed for all
the outgoing calls made from the telephone. 89 The pen register showed that
Smith was indeed calling McDonough's house, and the police subsequently
acquired a search warrant and recovered sufficient evidence to arrest
Smith.90
Like Olmstead, Michael Smith was using privacy-enhancing
technology to conceal his crimes from the police 9 1-if he had lived one
hundred years earlier and decided to threaten and verbally abuse his victim
in her own home, he would have had to go to her house in person, an action
that would have greatly increased his chances of being apprehended. After
the first offense, the police would have almost certainly posted an officer
near McDonough's house, and would likely have observed him returning to
make future threats. But because Smith used a telephone, the police were
83 Although Katz involved a defendant who was speaking on the phone, the device used
by the law enforcement agents did not tap into the phone line but simply attached an
electronic listening device to the outside of the phone booth the defendant was using. Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 362 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). Thus, the case did not
involve responsive surveillance technology (such as a telephone wiretap) but simply first-
category electronic bugging.
84 442 U.S. 735 (1979).









forced to respond with their own new technology-in this case, a device
which could track outgoing telephone calls.
92
As in the Olmstead case, the Court in Smith had to search for an
analogy for the phone numbers of outgoing calls in order to determine
whether law enforcement officers invaded a "legitimate expectation of
privacy" when they used the pen register to obtain this information. 93 One
obvious analogy to the phone numbers would be to the content of telephone
calls themselves, which Congress deemed private information. 94 But the
Court rejected this analogy, stating that "a pen register differs significantly
from the listening device employed in Katz, for pen registers do not acquire
the contents of communications., 95 The Court then quoted from one of its
own recent decisions:
Indeed, a law enforcement official could not even determine from the use of a pen
register whether a communication existed. These devices do not hear sound. They
disclose only the telephone numbers that have been dialed-a means of establishing
communication. Neither the purport of any communication between the caller and the
recipient of the call, their identities, nor whether the call was even completed is
disclosed by pen registers.
96
Instead, the Court reasoned that the phone numbers Smith dialed were
akin to any other information that an individual turns over to a third party.
97
Smith could certainly not have any subjective expectation of privacy in
these numbers, because "[a]ll telephone users realize that they must
'convey' phone numbers to the telephone company, since it is through
telephone company switching equipment that their calls are completed." 98
And society would not recognize any such expectation of privacy as
"reasonable," because "a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in
information he voluntarily turns over to third parties." 99 The Court then
analogized the phone numbers dialed by Smith-information which he
"voluntarily" gave to the telephone company-to financial information that
a bank depositor gives to bank employees.100 The Court also cited cases of
92 Id.
93 The Court made it clear that although the phone company installed the pen register, it
did so at the request of the police, and so was acting as an "agent" of the police for the
purposes of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 740 n.4.
94 The Federal Communications Act of 1934 prohibited intercepting and disclosing any
information passing over telephone lines. 47 U.S.C. § 605 (2000).
9' Smith, 442 U.S. at 741.
96 Id. (quoting United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 167 (1977)).
97 Id. at 743-44.
98 Id. at 742.
99 Id. at 743-44.
1oo Id. at 744 (citing United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442-44 (1976)).
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giving financial information to an accountant °  and giving information to
an undercover government informant.1
0 2
It did not take long for this analogy-and the reasoning behind it-to
prove to be dangerously short-sighted. Today everyone who sends an e-
mail from anywhere in the world is "voluntarily" sending its contents to a
number of Internet service providers as part of the communication process.
Thus, under the Smith rationale, the Fourth Amendment does not protect the
contents of e-mail communication. 0 3  Most modern communications
networks cannot be utilized unless the user transfers information to
organizations within the network's infrastructure,10 4 and it is now obvious
that the transfer of that required information is nothing like giving financial
information to a bank or revealing information to a confidential informant.
But this was not obvious to the Supreme Court in 1979, and as a result the
Court chose a poor analogy to decide the case.
Courts and legislatures will continue to face this dilemma as they
review the use of the growing number of responsive surveillance
technologies. Although Congress has now stated that the contents of an e-
mail message deserve the same level of privacy as a telephone call, 05 the
wide diversity of privacy-enhancing technologies ensures that questions of
first impression will continue to crop up. What level of protection should
we give to information posted on a semi-public web site or a statement
made in a password-protected chat room? What level of protection does
information stored on network hard drives deserve? Even personal hard
drives pose real challenges for courts. Is information on a hard drive
analogous to information stored in a file cabinet? If so, is it "seizure" if the
government merely copies the contents of the hard drive without taking it
101 Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 323 (1973).
102 United States v. White, 495 U.S. 745, 746-47 (1971).
103 As was the case with wiretapping fifty years earlier, the United States Congress has
stepped in to protect the content of e-mail messages. See Electronic Communications
Privacy Act, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986); 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (2000)
(amending Title III so that the heightened standards apply to electronic messages as well).
104 See generally Kerr, Internet Surveillance, supra note 15 (discussing the necessity of
transferring information to an organization within three different communications networks:
the postal service, the telephone, and the Internet). One example of this is web surfing. See
id. at 613 n.29. In order to visit a website, a user types the website address into the browser.
Id. The computer then sends out signals to the remote computer that hosts the website and
the website sends a signal back. Id. In other words, "[c]ommunications networks require
partial (and sometimes total) disclosure to the network provider" to help the provider deliver




away? Is it a "search" if the government merely retains a copy of the
contents without looking at them?
10 6
Thus, courts frequently struggle to analogize this third category of
surveillance to a traditional search. And in the absence of such an analogy,
it is difficult to balance an individual's privacy rights with law
enforcement's duty to investigate crime. Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
has always involved striking the proper balance between these two
competing needs, and in the case of responsive surveillance, the individual
(and the potential criminal) has already changed that balance by using the
privacy-enhancing technology in the first place. Thus, courts must
determine how much privacy an individual deserves when she is talking on
the telephone, storing information in a network hard drive, buying a book
over the Internet, or uploading pictures to a webpage accessible only to
friends and family members. And on the other hand, how badly will it
interfere with law enforcement officers' efforts if their attempts at counter-
measures are curtailed? The Supreme Court struck the wrong balance in
Olmstead when it misunderstood the level of privacy that society demanded
for individuals who speak on the telephone. It struck the wrong balance
again in Smith when it failed to anticipate the nature of developing
communications networks, thus giving the government too much power to
intercept private communications.
V. THE PROPER BALANCE
One prominent Fourth Amendment scholar argues that the Fourth
Amendment is a "mechanism for regulating the information flow between
individuals and the state,"'' 0 7 and that privacy is merely a "vital byproduct of
Fourth Amendment rules, not its goal."'' 0 8 But in the wake of Katz, privacy
must be considered the focus of any Fourth Amendment inquiry-in other
words, it is more accurate to state that the Fourth Amendment is a
mechanism for regulating the flow of private information between
106 Professor Orin Kerr dealt with these questions in the context of digital technology
searches, noting that under current precedent (derived from a pre-digital era), law
enforcement agents do not commit a search or a seizure if they copy the contents of your
hard drive and store the contents on their own computers. Orin S. Kerr, Searches and
Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REv. 531, 558-60 (2005). Kerr notes that this is a
"troublesome result." Id. at 560. "The idea that the government could freely generate copies
of our hard drives and indefinitely retain them in government storage seems too Orwellian-
and downright creepy-to be embraced as a Fourth Amendment rule." Id.
'07 Id. at 535.
"' Id. at 585.
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individuals and the state. 0 9 The level of regulation (in other words, the
level of protection) is dependent upon the level of privacy that we want to
give to the information. If the information is intimately private, the Fourth
Amendment should afford it the greatest level of protection and require a
significant showing on the part of the government before allowing law
enforcement to gather it-regardless of the type of technology used to
gather the information. Courts have already followed this path in applying
the protections of the Fourth Amendment to such hyper-intrusive searches
as video cameras in private spaces," 0 surgical procedures to remove
evidence from a defendant,"' and no-knock search warrants. 2  They
should also apply this standard to intercepting telephone calls, intercepting
e-mail communications, and eavesdropping electronically. Indeed, courts
likely would already have done so if Congress had not already created a
heightened standard through statute." 3  The next level down would be
gathering information in which the individual has a reasonable expectation
of privacy, but which does not involve intercepting personal conversations
or secretly monitoring activities inside one's one home-that is, gathering
private but not intimately private information. In these cases, mere
probable cause should be sufficient to overcome the individual's privacy
interests. This standard would apply for searches of most private areas,
whether information is stored in file cabinets or hard drives. And finally,
109 The Katz standard states that government surveillance is a "search" if it infringes on
the target's "reasonable expectation of privacy." United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 360
(1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). The language of the Fourth Amendment does not focus
solely on information generally, but also on private information: "The right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated .... U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
110 See, e.g., United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 883-84 (7th Cir. 1984) (interpreting
the Fourth Amendment to require the government to meet the heightened Title III
requirements before video surveillance can be authorized).
111 See, e.g., Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 759-62 (1985) (setting out special factors that
courts should consider in determining whether a surgical procedure on the defendant is
"reasonable").
112 See, e.g., Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 929-36 (1995) (acknowledging that a
silent-entry search warrant is a heightened intrusion and authorizing such a warrant only if
the government makes a showing beyond probable cause, such as proving that silent entry is
necessary to prevent violence, or that evidence would likely be destroyed if notice were
given); see also Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (1987). For an overview of the legal
standards governing each of these types of "hyper-intrusive" searches, see generally Ric
Simmons, Can Winston Save Us from Big Brother? The Need for Judicial Consistency in
Regulating Hyper-Intrusive Searches, 55 RUTG. L. REV. 547 (2003).
113 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22 (2000) (codifying both Title III of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, which regulates interception of oral and wire
communications, and the Electronic Communication and Privacy Act of 1986, which
regulates interception of electronic communications).
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there should be one (or more) categories of information that are only semi-
private, which the Fourth Amendment should regulate but that would
require a lesser showing than probable cause-for example, phone numbers
that are dialed on the telephone, addresses of e-mails that are sent, and
information posted on password-protected blogs. This is information that is
not fully public, but that individuals are aware can be seen or recorded by
others. And finally, if the information is public, the Fourth Amendment
does not regulate the information flow at all.
Others have proposed such a "sliding scale" of Fourth Amendment and
statutory protection before.1 4 The critical (and challenging) task for courts
in the context of regulating responsive technology is determining the
appropriate level of privacy for the various kinds of communication and
114 Professor Kerr has compiled a comprehensive categorization of the existing legal
thresholds for government surveillance:
(1) No Legal Process: The government can acquire the information without process or order;
(2) Subpoena: The government must obtain a subpoena, such as a grand jury subpoena, duces
tecum or an administrative subpoena, before acquiring the information. The subpoena compels
the provider to disclose the information to the government;
(3) Relevance Court Order: The government must obtain a court order before acquiring the
information but can obtain the order merely by certifying to the court that the information likely
to be obtained is relevant to a law enforcement investigation;
(4) Articulable Facts Court Order: The government must obtain a court order before acquiring
the information, and to obtain the order must offer specific and articulable facts establishing
reasonable grounds to believe the information to be obtained is both relevant and material to an
ongoing criminal investigation;
(5) Probable Cause Search Warrant: The government must obtain a search warrant before
acquiring the information. The search warrant requires "probable cause," which in the criminal
context means that the government must offer facts establishing a likelihood that a crime has
occurred and that evidence of the crime exists in the location to be searched;
(6) "Super" Search Warrant: The government must obtain a special search warrant before
acquiring the information that adds the threshold requirements beyond those of ordinary search
warrants (e.g. requiring the government to exhaust all other means of obtaining the information,
requiring special authorization); and
(7) The Government May Not Acquire the Information by Any Legal Process: The law may
forbid the government from acquiring the information regardless of the legal process.
Kerr, Internet Surveillance, supra note 15, at 620-21 tbl.2.
Thus, courts and legislatures have already categorized many different levels of protection
for information, and the task for future courts and legislatures is to decide where to place any
new method of surveillance. In my proposal, anything occurring in the public belongs in
category (1), receiving no protection; intimate private activity belongs in category (6), which
requires a showing greater than a warrant; standard private activity belongs in category (5),
which merely requires a warrant, and the "semi-public" information would be placed in
categories (2)-(4), depending on how private the information actually is.
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data storage used by individuals in a world of privacy-enhancing
technology.
If we properly focus on private information, we must first
acknowledge that standards of privacy have changed in the twenty-first
century.' 15 Individuals put an unprecedented amount of private information
into the public arena-both intentionally and unintentionally. Many
individuals choose to use what we have termed "privacy-enhancing
technology" in precisely the opposite way-to make their private lives
more public. Diaries which were once kept hidden under mattresses are
now posted on blogs, along with personal pictures and messages from
friends. Telephone conversations that used to occur in homes or private
phone booths are now carried out on the street and in malls, stores, and
other public areas. This intentional use of technology to reduce one's own
privacy diminishes the difficulty of the Fourth Amendment analysis: if an
individual willingly discloses private information about himself and thereby
makes it available to law enforcement, the conflict between the individual's
privacy and law enforcement's need to gather information disappears.
Of course, much of the loss of privacy in our society is not due to our
own personal choice. Because of the ease of information transfer in modem
life, records that used to be public only in theory are now public in
practice-from how much you paid for your house to how much money
you gave to your Congressman's campaign fund.1 16 Meanwhile, companies
buy and sell lists of consumer purchases and preferences, maintaining this
115 Shaun Spencer has suggested that as advances in technology have made more
intrusive surveillance possible, individuals' expectations of privacy have incrementally
diminished. See Shaun B. Spencer, Reasonable Expectations and the Erosion of Privacy, 39
SAN DIEGO L. REv. 843 (2002). For example, when employers monitor employees'
telephone and e-mail use in the workplace, they diminish the expectation of privacy in the
workplace. Id. at 860. Likewise, if merchants continually sell consumers' information, they
diminish consumers' expectation of privacy in that personal information. Id. According to
Spencer's theory, this encroachment and erosion "proceeds so gradually that it seems like the
inevitable price of progress." Id. at 861.
116 For example, in Franklin County, Ohio, an interested neighbor (or any other person in
the world) can go to the Franklin County Auditor's website and simply type in his
neighbor's name to discover a myriad of information about his neighbor's home, including
the price for which his neighbor bought the home and the current appraisal. See Joseph W.
Testa, Franklin County Auditor, http://franklin.govemmaxa.com/propertymax/rover30.asp
(last visited Apr. 21, 2007). To learn who is contributing to a federal political candidate, one
need only visit the Federal Election Commission's website and either type in the candidate's
name or type in an individual's name to see to whom that individual is contributing. See
Campaign Finance Data Disclosure Search, http://www.fec.gov/finance/disclosure/
disclosuredatasearch.shtml (last visited Apr. 21, 2007).
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commercial yet personal information on vast computer databases. 17 Many
social commentators have decried this loss of privacy-but again, the
problem is not caused by new technology, but by the initial determination
of what kind of information should be public and what should be private. It
may be troubling that government agents can more easily get access to
public information when it is posted on the web instead of buried in a file
cabinet in a remote county courthouse-but the response to this concern is
not to limit technology. Instead, perhaps we need to change the law to limit
the amount of public information that is available. And if the ease of
compiling and transferring consumer information between companies has
led to abuses of the information, such transfers could be banned.
As it turns out, society seems to be moving in the opposite direction-
changing the laws to make more and more information public. For
example, criminal records have traditionally been kept confidential-but
now individuals who have been convicted of a sex offense have their names
posted on public websites, along with their address and details of their
crime,' 18 while drunk drivers are forced to purchase distinctive license
plates so that everyone on the road knows of their crime.'1 19
In the end, the threat to privacy is not caused by the advanced
surveillance technology being used by the government, but by the inability
of courts (and, to a lesser degree, legislatures) to determine the appropriate
level of privacy for the different kinds of information being gathered.
Ironically, courts and policymakers find it relatively easy to set this level of
privacy for the most intrusive kinds of technology-our first category-
because the information being gathered is unambiguously intimate. The
challenge arises when individuals use privacy-enhancing technology to
make formerly public information private or quasi-private. When law
enforcement attempts to collect that kind of information, it is difficult to tell
"17 Tom Zeller, Jr., Breach Points Up Flaws in Privacy Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2005,
at CI (discussing "big data brokers" that collect and sell consumer information).
118 Federal law requires each state to implement such a sex offender registry and to
participate in the national sex offender registry. 42 U.S.C. § 14071. The national sex
offender registry, like most state registries, is available online for public viewing. See Dru
Sjodin National Sex Offender Public Registry, U.S. Dept. of Justice, http://www.nsopr.gov
(last visited Apr. 21, 2007) (enabling a person to look up sex offenders by zip code or other
information and view the offender's name, address, picture, classification, offenses, and even
the offender's "victim preferences"). Some states go beyond the minimum federal mandate
and require local authorities to actively inform the community of sex offenders living in that
community by going door-to-door or mailing information about the offender directly to the
affected community. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 22-4011 (2006) (allowing active notification);
N.J. STAT. § 2C:7-8c (2006) (requiring active notification to the affected community when
risk of re-offense is high).
"9 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE § 4503.231 (West 2006).
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what level of protection it deserves. Courts and legislatures will have to
continue to deal with these questions on a case-by-case basis, and mistakes
will be inevitable due to rapidly changing technological and social norms.
Judges and policymakers, however, will be more likely to come to the right
conclusions if they begin their inquiry by considering the type of
information that is being gathered and then determine the appropriate level
of privacy for that type of information.
There are two relatively clear reforms that should be made. The first is
to re-visit the Smith v. Maryland doctrine, which currently gives no Fourth
Amendment protection to any communication (other than a traditional
letter) which is entrusted to a third party in the communications network.
Even though Congress has stepped in to cover Internet transmissions and
stored messages, there is no reason why the Fourth Amendment itself
should not also protect these communications, which most of society views
as deserving of the highest level of privacy.
1 20
At the other extreme, some privacy-enhancing technology makes it
possible to hide information from law enforcement agents so effectively
that they can never obtain the information they seek, regardless of how
badly they need it or what kind of showing they make to a judge. In these
situations, just as when surveillance technology makes it impossible to hide
information from the government, Congress should intervene to maintain
the proper balance between an individual's right to privacy and the needs of
law enforcement. The current level of encryption technology makes it
possible for citizens and criminals to hide all of their stored data and mask
the contents of all of their communication,' 2' thus enabling individuals to
obtain a level of privacy which we would almost certainly not want to
create by law if we had a choice: complete immunity from government
surveillance, regardless of the showing made by the government. It would
make sense to restore the balance by requiring everyone who uses a
complex encryption device to deposit the key to the encryption in
escrow122 -law enforcement agents could not gain access to the key unless
they made a sufficient showing to a court, which would depend on the level
of privacy that the encrypted information warranted.
120 Bellia, supra note 18, at 1458 (arguing that government agents should have to obtain
a warrant before seizing e-mail messages stored by a third party).
121 See infra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
122 See D. Forest Wolfe, Comment, The Government's Right to Read: Maintaining State




VI. OTHER EFFECTS OF TECHNOLOGY ON PRIVACY
In addition to enhancing the privacy of many everyday activities and
increasing the surveillance power of law enforcement, technology has
affected privacy in a number of other ways. Although at least one of those
ways has indirectly led to a loss of privacy, other effects have the potential
to result in greater protections from government intrusion.
A. THE TRUE THREAT THAT TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES POSE TO
PRIVACY
In one sense, new technology has indirectly caused a loss of privacy,
but not in the way that most people realize. Simply put, technology has
exponentially increased the damage done by certain crimes. A child
pornographer who wants to distribute his goods in the past was limited by
very real practical constraints as to the number of pictures he could
distribute and the number of people to whom he could distribute them.
Today, computers and e-mail make these limits obsolete. A teenage vandal
in past eras might break store windows or spray-paint graffiti on walls.
Today, that same teenager might write a computer virus and cause
thousands or millions of dollars worth of damage. 123 An anarchist in the
nineteenth century might seek to assassinate a president or plant dynamite
in an opera house 124 -his twenty-first century counterpart has the ability to
destroy cities with a nuclear weapon or poison an entire society with
chemical or biological agents.
The political reaction has been predictable: the increased potential for
damage caused by these new technologies has led policymakers to conclude
that the government should be given more power to investigate suspected
criminals. Some of this reaction is a legitimate response to the new
dangers, while some is hypercharged political posturing. The result is a
significant shift in the balancing act between individual privacy rights and
law enforcement's power to investigate crime. For example, the threat of
international terrorism is so dangerous that the federal government began
tracing all of our outgoing international telephone calls without court
approval.125 In a recent pair of cases, the .threat of terrorism on public
transportation has led the Second Circuit to broaden the "special needs"
123 One of the most destructive crimes in history was the creation of the "I Love You"
virus in 2000, which infected 45 million computers and caused an estimated $10 billion of
damage in this country alone. See Cybercrime: Piercing the Darkness,
http://library.thinkquest.org/04oct/00460/ILoveYou.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2007).
124 See For Jihadist, Read Anarchist-The anarchists, ECONOMIST, Aug. 20, 2005.
125 Eric Lichtblau & James Risen, Spy Agency Mined Vast Data Trove, Officials Report,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2006, at Al.
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exception to the probable cause and warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment, allowing suspicionless searches and seizures of all riders on
subways and ferries." 6 Of course, this shift towards increased government
power is evident everywhere, not just in the realm of the Fourth
Amendment-the same terrorist threat led the federal government to begin
holding suspects in detention without a charge, denying them access to
lawyers, and trying them in special tribunals with different rules of
evidence in order to protect "national security."
' 127
B. THE PROMISE OF THE NEXT GENERATION OF SURVEILLANCE
TECHNOLOGY
Although it may seem counterintuitive, improved surveillance
technology could actually help to increase individual privacy in the future
in two ways, by allowing for more refined and less intrusive searches and
by increasing the monitoring of law enforcement.
1. Raising the Standards of Reasonableness
Newer generations of surveillance technology should be able to be far
more discriminating in what they are searching for, and to search for it more
quickly and less invasively-thus allowing for narrower and less intrusive
searches. We already have examples of surveillance technology that
conducts authorized searches more quickly and with less invasion of
privacy than traditional methods-for example, metal detectors and x-ray
machines at airports. In these contexts, the law enforcement agent has the
right to search the individual with a more time-consuming and more
invasive pat-down, and also has the right to sift through the contents of a
suitcase one by one. By using this new technology, the agent actually
enhances the individual's privacy.
The potential for more narrowly targeted searches is even greater in
the digital realm. Instead of manually searching through a target's e-mail
account and reading all of the incoming and outgoing communications, the
government can use software that can sift through and copy only those
messages with incriminating words or specific names, thus letting the
innocent ones pass through without any human ever reading them. 2 8 As
126 Cassidy v. Chertoff, 471 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 2006) (ferries); MacWade v. Kelly, 460
F.3d 260 (2d Cir. 2006) (subways).
127 See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Justices Are Urged to Dismiss Padilla Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 18, 2005, at A14.
128 The government first created its own software for this purpose-the much-maligned
"Carnivore" device, which was re-named "DCS1000" in 2001. See Jennifer DiSabatino,
FBI's Carnivore Gets a Name Change, COMPUTERWORLD, Feb. 12, 2001,
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technology progresses, law enforcement may begin using surveillance tools
that are so narrowly targeted that they only alert their human user if they
sense illegal activity, much like a drug-sniffing dog only reacts when
contraband is present. Examples of these "binary" surveillance tools are a
gun detector that can see through clothing but whose only output is a light
that comes on when the unmistakable outline of a gun is detected; or
sophisticated software that can sift through e-mail messages and detect the
presence of child pornography, at which point it will copy the image and
the sender's e-mail address. 2 9
These new devices will increase privacy (since they are less likely to
intercept innocent communications or reveal innocent private
communication) but not decrease law enforcement's power to investigate-
in fact, they will make investigations more efficient. A logical next step in
the development of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence might be to adjust the
determination of what is a "reasonable" search based on the surveillance
technologies available-a broader, more invasive search which was
permissible decades ago may no longer be reasonable if law enforcement
has access to devices which can make the search narrower or less invasive.
In fact, the Title III requirements for wiretapping and electronic
eavesdropping already lay the foundation for this kind of shifting standard,
since in order to receive such an order, government agents must
demonstrate inter alia that they are conducting the surveillance in such a
way as to minimize the interception of irrelevant information. 30  For
example, if a government agent is seeking a Title III order to intercept all
the messages from an e-mail account, a judge may well ask why the agent
cannot instead hook up a device that will sift through the messages
mindlessly and only retain those that are incriminating.
Unfortunately, outside of the Title III context, in which least intrusive
means and minimization are built into the statutory test, courts so far do not
seem to be sympathetic to these arguments. In a recent Second Circuit case,
commuters challenged the U.S. Coast Guard's practice of randomly
http://www.computerworld.com/softwaretopics/software/story/0,10801,57633,00.html.
DCS1000 was attached to a specific Internet service provider, where it hunted for e-mail
messages to and/or from the target individual. Id. When it found an e-mail message that
met its programmed criteria, it copied the e-mail and stored it before sending it on its way.
Id. In 2005, the FBI abandoned the use of DCS1000 and now uses commercially available
software. See FBI Ditches Carnivore Surveillance System, ASSOCIATED PRESs, Jan. 18,
2005, available at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,144809,00.html. To use DCS1000
or any of its commercial replacements, the government must obtain a Title III order. See 18
U.S.C. §§ 2510-22 (2000).
129 See Simmons, supra note 74, at 1351-57.
130 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5).
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searching carry-on bags and vehicles on public ferries. 31 Plaintiffs argued
that metal detectors could be used as a less intrusive way of satisfying the
government's goal of protecting the ferries from terrorists. 132 The Second
Circuit rejected that argument, noting that, "The Supreme Court has
repeatedly stated that reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment does not
require employing the least intrusive means to accomplish the government's
ends."' 33 In other words, the "reasonableness" of a search is unrelated to
whether the government could have accomplished the same goal using a
less intrusive technology.
Ultimately, perhaps, the widespread availability of less intrusive and
more narrowly tailored methods of surveillance may lead courts to include
these factors in their tests for reasonableness. Until then, it will be up to
legislatures to create such requirements, either by directly mandating the
method of surveillance which is appropriate under certain conditions, or by
creating statutes like Title III that expressly cite these as factors which must
be satisfied before a search can be conducted.
2. Watching the Watchers
The second way in which new surveillance technology can enhance
privacy is by using technology to monitor the activities of law enforcement.
A recurring problem in regulating the practice of law enforcement agents in
the criminal procedure context is not the legal rules that govern the situation
but simply determining exactly what happened. Most fact patterns in
disputes about appropriate police conduct involve two witnesses-the
police officer and the suspect-and in most cases the suspect's version of
the story will carry very little weight for the judge who is deciding a
suppression motion. This has led to at least the potential (and in some
situations the reality) of abuse on the part of law enforcement officers. If a
police officer testifies that he read the Miranda rights to the defendant
before the interrogation began, or that the defendant failed to ask for a
lawyer before confessing to the crime, there is generally little that a
defendant can do to persuade the judge otherwise. This is not to say that
most police officers lie about their actions during an interrogation, but
rather that the lack of effective monitoring inevitably leads to suboptimal
conduct on the part of the police.
Nowhere in criminal procedure is this potential for abuse greater than
in the search and seizure context, because officer discretion is greatest at
'3' Cassidy, 471 F.3d 67.
132 Id. at 80.
133 Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted).
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that stage of the investigatory process. Police officers pull over cars after
allegedly observing erratic driving; they arrest suspects after allegedly
seeing the suspect drop a bag of drugs onto the sidewalk; they conduct a
Terry stop on the basis of alleged suspicious activity. Many of the most
scathing critiques of law enforcement conduct have nothing to do with the
legal standards themselves; rather, they center on the serious potential for
violation of these standards and subsequent perjury on the part of the law
enforcement officer. 134 Unmonitored police conduct in this area poses a
significant threat to individual privacy, especially among the poor and
minority groups, since they tend to live in high crime areas where police are
more likely to bend the law in order to further their investigation.
New technologies offer great promise in this area. For example, in the
context of interrogations, introducing a tape recorder or video camera into
the interrogation room can serve as an effective way of monitoring police
conduct by deterring most abuses and detecting those that do occur. In the
search and seizure context (the context most applicable to individual
privacy), there is not yet a technological "magic bullet" which can ensure
police compliance-but there is progress being made. More and more
police cars are being equipped with dashboard video cameras, so that the
allegedly erratic or reckless driving of a suspect (and the police conduct
during the traffic stop itself) can be recorded and thereby monitored. In
fact, as video technology gets cheaper and smaller, it will soon become
feasible to record everything a police officer driving a squad car sees and
hears-as well as everything that police officer does during the traffic stop.
The next step would be to develop some way of making an audio and video
record of all police observations and conduct while on duty, whether in a
squad car, walking a beat, or responding to a call inside a home or a store-
for example, some kind of miniature video recorder attached to the uniform
of every officer. The technology for making these records for each of the
million-plus law enforcement officers does not yet exist, but such a
possibility is not inconceivable within ten or twenty years. More to the
point, there is no reason why we would not want to do this once it becomes
technologically and economically feasible. Such a policy would prevent
134 See Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perjury and What to Do About It, 67 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1037, 1041-48 (1996) (discussing surveys and other data which support the
notion that police, with prosecutors' knowledge, regularly lie in warrant applications and in
suppression hearings to cover up lack of probable cause or failure to properly follow
Miranda rules). One set of commentators, in response to evidence suggesting a high rate of
police "testilying," suggested liberalizing rules of evidence to allow defendants more ability
to impeach police officers' testimony. See Gabriel Chin & Scott Wells, The "Blue Wall of
Silence " as Evidence of Bias and Motive to Lie: A New Approach to Police Perjury, 59 U.
PITr. L. REv. 233, 272-99 (1998).
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abuses on the part of law enforcement, provide judges at the suppression
hearing a clear, neutral factual record of how the investigation was
conducted, and-not incidentally-provide excellent substantive evidence
for the actual criminal trial itself.
Just as improved surveillance technology can lead to more narrowly
targeted surveillance, these monitoring technologies can lead to improved
police conduct, thus enhancing individual privacy. Once again, we can
encourage steps in this direction by enacting laws which promote or require
law enforcement to use such devices. In the interrogation context, for
example, at least four states have required that all custodial interrogations
must be electronically recorded. 35 Legislatures and courts can and should
begin to create the same kind of requirements for the search and seizure
context, thus ensuring that law enforcement officers follow the laws that
already exist.
VII. CONCLUSION
It is true that in some ways, technology has given the government the
ability to invade our privacy in new and troubling ways. Listening and
even looking through walls; flying over our open fields and backyards;
implanting hidden microphones and cameras in our homes and offices-in
all of these ways, emerging technology has given the government a great
advantage in its search for criminal activity and made everyone a little less
secure in their homes. It is also true that other kinds of technology have
allowed the government to conduct otherwise onerous public surveillance
much more quickly and efficiently, thus making our conduct in public and
our public information more vulnerable to government monitoring.
But in many other ways, technology has increased our privacy quite
dramatically, and what at first seem to be insidious methods of
eavesdropping and snooping-wiretapping phones, monitoring e-mails,
searching computer hard drives-are actually simply remedial measures on
the part of the government in an attempt to maintain the appropriate balance
between individual privacy and effective law enforcement.
When evaluating the current laws regulating surveillance technology,
we should first ask: What level of privacy does the type of information
deserve? Privacy-enhancing technologies muddle this question a bit, since
they create methods of data storage and communication that have never
been seen before and are therefore hard to categorize. But commentators
135 Steven A. Drizin & Marissa J. Reich, Heeding the Lessons of History: The Need for
Mandatory Recording of Police Interrogations to Accurately Assess the Reliability and
Voluntariness of Confessions, 52 DRAKE L. REv. 619, 620 (2004) (noting that Alaska,
Minnesota, Illinois, and Maine require the recording of all custodial interrogations).
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who worry about new surveillance technology eroding our privacy should
keep a couple of points in mind. First, thanks in large part to new
technologies, by most measures we have more privacy today than at any
other time in history. Second, as technology has changed the way we
communicate and store information, as well as the way in which the
government can spy on our behavior, the law has adapted to these changes,
usually weighing in to protect the privacy of innocent civilians and would-
be criminals.
There are some glaring exceptions to this rule, particularly with regard
to responsive surveillance technology, when courts have struggled to
determine the appropriate level of privacy for a new method of
communication. But in other areas, such as encryption technology,
anonymous e-mail accounts, and the use of disposable cell phones, current
technologies create much greater levels of privacy than we have seen in the
past, allowing individuals to keep communications and data hidden from
the government to an unprecedented degree and perhaps requiring
government intervention to reduce the amount of privacy provided.
Finally, courts and legislatures should be aware of the ways to
encourage the use of technologies which will both increase privacy and
increase security. Stricter requirements for certain kinds of surveillance can
force law enforcement officers to use technology that provides more
narrowly tailored and less intrusive searches, while increased monitoring of
law enforcement behavior can prevent police misconduct as well as provide
better evidence of criminal activity. Contrary to popular belief, new
technologies are not the cause of eroding privacy in our society-but if
prodded in the right direction, they could be a big part of the cure.
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